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Abstract
This paper describes a simple and efficient asynchronous Binary Byzantine faulty tolerant
consensus algorithm. In the algorithm, non-faulty nodes perform an initial broadcast followed
by a executing a series of rounds each consisting of a single message broadcast plus the com-
putation of a global random coin using threshold signatures. Each message is accompanied by
a cryptographic proof of its validity. Up to one third of the nodes can be faulty and termi-
nation is expected in a constant number of rounds. An optimization is described allowing the
round message plus the coin message to be combined, reducing rounds to a single message delay.
Geo-distributed experiments are run on replicates in ten data center regions showing average
latencies as low as 400 milliseconds.
1 Introduction and related work.
Binary byzantine consensus concerns the problem of getting a set of distinct processes distributed
across a network to agree on a single binary value 0 or 1 where processes can fail in arbitrary ways.
It is well known that this problem is impossible in an asynchronous network with at least one faulty
process [22]. To get around this, algorithms can employ randomization [1, 2, 5, 6, 10, 23, 25, 30,
31, 35, 37, 39], or rely on an additional synchrony assumption [17, 18]. Randomized algorithms
normally rely on the existence of a local or global random coin. The output of local coin is only
visible to an individual process, while the output of a global coin is visible to all processes, but
only once a threshold of processes have participated in computing the coin.
The algorithm presented in this paper uses a global coin, assumes at most one third of the
processes are faulty (a well know lower bound [27]), and terminates in expected O(1) number of
message delays. While there are many algorithms that solve this problem with the same guar-
antees [1, 9, 32], this algorithm focuses on simplicity and efficiency. Namely, it starts with each
process broadcasting an initial proposal, then executing a series of rounds that consist of two all
to all message broadcasts. The first being to distribute processes current binary estimates, and the
second being used to compute the output of the global coin.
The design of the algorithm is primarily based on two previous algorithms; [9] and [30]. While
these algorithms provide similar theoretical guarantees, they are slightly more complex/costly.
In this paper, like in [9], threshold signatures [14, 15, 16, 38] are used to implement the global
coin, and a set of cryptographic signatures are included with each message proving its validity.
The algorithm presented here differs in that it requires one less all to all message broadcast per
round. Similar to the randomized algorithm of [30] this work relies on a global coin for correctness.
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Differently, [30] does not include cryptographic signatures with each message, but requires up to 2
additional message broadcasts per round and furthermore is not fully asynchronous as it requires
a fair scheduler to ensure termination in all cases [31].
While the binary consensus problem only allows process to agree on a single binary value,
there exist many reductions to multi-value consensus [32, 33, 40, 41] allowing processes to agree
on arbitrary values. Furthermore many algorithms [3, 11] exists that solve multi-value consensus
directly through the use of types of synchrony assumptions to ensure termination. Additionally,
algorithms exists that make many different assumptions about the model such as synchrony [19],
different fault models [28, 29, 36], solve different definitions of consensus [34], and so on.
It should should be noted that the design of this algorithm follows closely the algorithm of [12],
but [12] relies on partial synchrony [18] for termination through the use of a weak round coordinator
and timeout. In most cases that algorithm terminates much faster and does not require threshold
signatures. It is therefore suggested to use that algorithm over this one, unless a truly adversarial
asynchronous network is expected.
2 A Byzantine Computation Model.
This section describes the assumed computation model. For simplicity we assume idealized cryp-
tographic assumptions.
Asynchronous processes. The system is made up of a set Π of n asynchronous sequential
processes, namely Π = {p1, . . . , pn}; i is called the “index” of pi. “Asynchronous” means that each
process proceeds at its own speed, which can vary with time and remains unknown to the other
processes. “Sequential” means that a process executes one step at a time. This does not prevent it
from executing several threads with an appropriate multiplexing. Both notations i ∈ Y and pi ∈ Y
are used to say that pi belongs to the set Y .
Communication network. The processes communicate by exchanging messages through an
asynchronous reliable point-to-point network. “Asynchronous” means that there is no bound on
message transfer delays, but these delays are finite. “Reliable” means that the network does not
lose, duplicate, modify, or create messages. “Point-to-point” means that any pair of processes is
connected by a bidirectional channel. A process pi sends a message to a process pj by invoking
the primitive “send tag(m) to pj”, where tag is the type of the message and m its content. To
simplify the presentation, it is assumed that a process can send messages to itself. A process pi
receives a message by executing the primitive “receive()”. The macro-operation broadcast tag(m)
is used as a shortcut for “for each pi ∈ Π do send tag(m) to pj end for”.
Signatures. Asymmetric cryptography allow processes to sign messages. Each process pi has a
public key known by everyone and a private key known only by pi. All messages are signed using
the private key and can be validated by any process with the corresponding public key, allowing
the process to identify the signer of the message. Signatures are assumed to be unforgeable. A
process will ignore any message that is malformed or contains an invalid signature.
(n − t) non-interactive threshold signatures. Given the set of n processes, taking n − t
signatures of the same message from n− t different processes can be combined to generate a unique
threshold signature that can be verified by a threshold public key known by everyone. Any set of
n − t signatures of the same message from n − t different processes generates the same threshold
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signature. Threshold signatures are assumed to be unforgeable and no set of less than n− t nodes
can generate them.
Random oracle. A random oracle [20] is assumed giving us access to an ideal cryptographic
hash function. This function takes a set of bits as input and deterministically outputs a random
fixed length set of bits.
Failure model. Up to t processes can exhibit a Byzantine behavior [36]. A Byzantine process
is a process that behaves arbitrarily: it can crash, fail to send or receive messages, send arbitrary
messages, start in an arbitrary state, perform arbitrary state transitions, etc. Moreover, Byzantine
processes can collude to “pollute” the computation (e.g., by sending messages with the same con-
tent, while they should send messages with distinct content if they were non-faulty). A process that
exhibits a Byzantine behavior is called faulty. Otherwise, it is non-faulty. Let us notice that, as
unforgeable signatures are used no Byzantine process can impersonate another process. Byzantine
processes can control the network by modifying the order in which messages are received, but they
cannot postpone forever message receptions.
3 Binary Byzantine Consensus.
3.1 The Binary Consensus Problem.
In the binary consensus problem processes input a value to the algorithm, called their proposal,
run an algorithm consisting of several rounds, and eventually output a binary value called their
decision. Let V be the set of values that can be proposed. While V can contain any number (≥ 2) of
values in multi-valued consensus, it contains only two values in binary consensus, e.g., V = {0, 1}.
Assuming that each non-faulty process proposes a value, the binary Byzantine consensus (BBC)
problem is for each of them to decide on a value in such a way that the following properties are
satisfied:
• BBC-Termination. Every non-faulty process eventually decides on a value.
• BBC-Agreement. No two non-faulty processes decide on different values.
• BBC-Validity. If all non-faulty processes propose the same value, no other value can be
decided.
Notations.
• The acronym BAMPn,t[∅] is used to denote the basic Byzantine Asynchronous Message-
Passing computation model; ∅ means that there is no additional assumption.
• The basic computation model strengthened with the additional constraint t < n/3 is denoted
BAMPn,t[t < n/3].
• A signature of process i is θi.
• A message m signed by process i is (m, θi).
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3.2 A Safe and Live Consensus Algorithm in BAMPn,t[t < n/3].
Message types. The following message types are used by the consensus.
• aux[r](v). An aux message contains a round number r and a binary value v.
• 〈(aux[r](v), θi), proofs〉. A tuple containing an aux message signed by process i and a set
proofs containing signed aux messages from a previous round that are used to prove v is a
valid binary proposal for round r.
• (coin[r], θi). A message for round r signed by process i that will be used to generate random
global coin outputs.
Valid Notation. For a given round r ≥ 1 a binary value b is valid if b has been proposed by a
non-faulty process and ¬b has not been decided in any round before r. An 〈(aux[r](v), θi), proofs〉
is valid if binary value v is valid in round r. The algorithm describes a function that is used to
compute the validity of a message given r, v, and proofs as input.
An (n−t)-threshold random global coin. The existence of a random global coin is assumed for
both correctness and termination of the algorithm. The coin is “flipped” when processes participate
in computing the output of the coin for a given round of the algorithm. The following properties
are ensured by the coin.
• c-binary. The output of a coin flip is a binary value.
• c-threshold. The output of a coin flip is not revealed until at least n−t processes participate
in the coin flip.
• c-global. All processes observe the same output of a coin flip.
• c-random. The output of the coin flip is random meaning that before n− t processes have
participated in flipping the coin then no process can correctly guess the output of the coin
with probability greater than 1/2.
• c-flip. The coin can be flipped any number of times.
In the algorithm a coin is flipped every round as follows: When a process signs and broadcasts
a
(
coin[r], θi
)
message, the process is considered to have participated in flipping the coin for round
r. The output of the coin is generated by taking the first bit of the cryptographic hash computed
using the (n− t) threshold signature of the (coin[r], θi) message as input. Given that a threshold
signatures are unique, cannot be computed with less than (n− t) signatures, and that the output
of the cryptographic hash is random, the properties of the coin are ensured. The algorithm [9]
generates random coin values in a similar manner.
Variables. The following variables are used throughout all rounds of the consensus.
• ri. Current round number of process i.
• esti. Current estimate at process i. It can either be a binary value (0 or 1) or it can be the
special value c val meaning the estimate will chosen as the result of the coin flip of round
ri.
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• coin mapi. Map from round to the binary value corresponding to the result of the coin flip
for that round at process i.
• aux values i. Set of valid signed aux messages received by process i throughout all rounds of
the consensus.
operation bin propose(vi) is
(01) ri ← 0; aux valuesi ← ∅; coin mapi ← ∅;
(02) broadcast 〈(aux[ri](vi), θi), ∅〉; // Broadcast the initial proposal
(03) wait until (n− t) valid aux[ri]() messages have been received from (n− t) different processes;
(04) if (at least (t+ 1) valid aux[ri](0) messages have been received from (t+ 1) different processes)
(05) then esti ← 0
(06) else esti ← 1
(07) end if
(08) while (true) do
(09) ri ← ri + 1;
(10) proofsi ← compute proofsi as a set of signed aux messages from aux valuesi that satisfy the
is valid predicate for binary value esti and round ri;
(11) broadcast 〈(aux[ri](esti), θi), proofs〉;
(12) wait until (n− t) valid aux[ri]() messages have been received from (n− t) different processes;
(13) if (∃ b val ∈ {0, 1} such that (n− t) valid aux[ri](b val) messages have been
received from (n− t) different processes)
(14) then esti ← b val
(15) else esti ← c val // esti will take the value of the coin when it is revealed
(16) end if
(17) broadcast
(
coin[ri], θi
)
;
(18) wait until (n− t) valid coin[ri] messages have been received from (n− t) different processes;
(19) coin mapi[ri]← compute the first bit of the cryptographic hash of the (n− t) threshold
signature of coin[ri];
(20) if (n− t) valid aux[ri](coin mapi[ri]) messages have been received from (n− t) different processes
(21) then decide(coin mapi[ri]) if not yet done end if
(22) if esti = c val then esti ← coin mapi[ri] end if
(23) end while;
when 〈(aux[rj ](estj), θj), proofs〉 is received
(24) if
(
is valid(rj , estj , proofs)
)
then
(25) proofs ← proofs\ {any messages in proofs not needed to satisfy the is valid predicate}.
(26) aux valuesi ← aux valuesi ∪ {
(
aux[rj ](estj), θj
)} ∪ proofs;
(27) end if.
Figure 1: A safe algorithm for the binary Byzantine consensus in BAMPn,t[t < n/3].
Algorithm description. Figures 1 and 2 describe the pseudo-code for the algorithm. The
bin propose operation of Figure 1 contains the main loop of the algorithm. The lines 24-27 handle
the reception of signed aux messages. The is valid predicate of Figure 2 describes the procedure
used to check if a binary value is valid for a given round and a set proofs of signed aux messages.
To start the consensus, each process pi calls bin propose with its initial binary proposal vi
(Figure 1). Line 01 initializes local variables, then on Line 02 the process broadcasts a signed
aux message with round 0, binary value vi, and an empty set for proofs as any round 0 message
is considered to be valid. The process then waits until n − t round 0 aux messages are received
(line 03). An initial estimate is then chosen by taking a binary value that has at least t + 1
broadcasters (lines 04-07). This ensures that the estimate was broadcast by a non-faulty process.
The process then repeats the while loop of Lines 08-23 for each round.
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predicate is valid(r, est, proofs) is
(01) if (r = 0) then return(true) end if;
(02) if (r = 1) then
(03) if (∃ signed messages aux[0](est) from t+ 1 different processes in proofs)
then return(true)
else return(false)
end if
(04) end if;
(05) prev r ← compute prev r as the largest round smaller than r where coin mapi[prev r] = ¬est
or 0 if no such round exists;
(06) if (prev r = 0 ∧ ∃ signed messages aux[0](est) from t+ 1 different processes in proofs)
then return(true)
(07) else if (∃ signed messages aux[prev r](est) from n− t different processes in proofs)
then return(true)
(08) end if
(09) return(false).
Figure 2: Algorithm for the is valid predicate.
A round starts by incrementing the round counter on line 04. The process then uses the is valid
predicate to compute a set of signed aux messages that prove esti is valid in the current round
(line 10). Next the process signs an aux message for round r with binary value esti and broadcasts
it along with the proofs generated on the previous line. The process then waits until n − t valid
aux messages are received from different processes for the current round (line 12). The estimate
of the valid binary values is then update on lines 13-16 as follows: First, if all of the received aux
messages contain the same binary value then the processes sets its estimate to this value, otherwise
it sets its estimate to c val, meaning that once the output of the coin flip for the current round is
revealed, the process will set its estimate to this value. Given that t < n/3, receiving n− t signed
aux messages of the same value ensures that any set of n− t signed aux messages for that round
will contain at least one aux message supporting the same value, thus all non-faulty processes will
set their estimate to either this value or the value of the coin.
The process then participates in computing the value of the coin for this round by broadcasting a
coin message (line 17). Next it waits until n− t signed coin messages have been received, computes
the n− t threshold signature of the message, inputs this value to the cryptographic hash function,
and takes first bit output as the value of the coin (lines 18-19). Following this, if n− t signed aux
messages have been received from different processes with the same value as the coin, this value is
decide (lines 20-21). Finally, if the estimate of the process has been set to c val, it is updated to
the value of the coin (line 22) and process continues to the next round.
Lines 24-27 describe what happens when a signed aux message and its proofs are received.
If the is valid predicate indicates that this message is valid, then the signed aux message and its
proofs are added to the aux values i set (lines 22-24). Line 24 ensures that no invalid messages are
added to aux values i.
Is valid predicate description. Figure 2 describes the is valid predicate that is called by Al-
gorithm 1 to check if a binary value is valid. It takes as input a round r, a binary value est and a
set of signed aux messages in proofs. As previously mentioned, the predicate should return true if
proofs ensures that (i) est was proposed by a non-faulty process and (ii) ¬est has not been decided
by any non-faulty process in any round before r. Otherwise false should be returned.
For round 0 the predicate immediately returns true as any initial proposal is valid (line 01).
For round 1, as no value can be decided in round 0, the predicate returns true if proofs contains
at least t+ 1 round 0 messages with binary value est (line 03), i.e. if (i) is satisfied.
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For any other round r > 1, the process computes the largest round prev r such that prev r < r
and the value of the coin in prev r was ¬est, otherwise prev r is set to 0 if no such round exists
(line 05). Given line 21 of Figure 1 we know that a value can only be decided if n − t messages
are received matching the value of the coin. Thus if prev r is 0, we know ¬est could not have
been decided before round r and the predicate is satisfied as long as proofs contains t + 1 signed
aux[0](est) messages. Otherwise if prev r > 0 the predicate is satisfied if proofs contains n − t
signed aux[prev r](est) messages. In this case, as t < n/3 no process could have received n − t
signed aux[prev r](¬est) messages and therefore no non-faulty process could have decided ¬est in
rounds from prev r until r. An argument by induction can be then made that ¬est was not decided
in any previous round.
If none of these cases are met then false is returned.
3.3 Proofs.
This section shows that the algorithm presented in Figure 1 solves the Binary consensus problem
in BAMPn,t[t < n/3] through a series of lemmas.
Lemma 1. For a given round r there can be at most one binary value b for which there exists at
least n− t signed aux[r](b) messages from different processes.
Proof. This follows from the fact that there are at most t < n/3 faulty processes and that non-faulty
processes sign and broadcast at most one aux message per round.
The following lemma shows that processes will receive enough messages in every round to
progress to the following round.
Lemma 2. At any non-faulty process pi with estimate esti and round ri > 0, pi will (eventually)
receive enough valid messages to satisfy the is valid predicate of Figure 2 for the ri and esti.
Proof. By line 01 of the is valid predicate all signed round 0 aux messages are valid and by line 02
of Figure 1 all non-faulty processes sign and broadcast a round 0 aux message. All non-faulty
processes will then receive at least n − t signed round 0 aux messages from different processes.
Given that t < n/3, of these n− t messages, at least t+1 messages supporting a single binary value
will be received and the process will set its estimate to this value on lines 04-06, satisfying line 03
of the is valid predicate for round 1. All non-faulty processes will then sign and broadcast a valid
aux message for round 1, participate in computing the coin, and advance to round 2.
Let the output of the coin for round 1 be some binary value b val1. In round 2 non-faulty
processes will receive at least n− t signed valid round 1 aux messages from different processes. If
n − t of these messages are of the form aux[1](¬b val1), then by line 07 of Figure 2 the is valid
predicate is satisfied for round 2. Additionally the process will set its estimate to ¬b val1 on line 14
of Figure 1. Otherwise, at least one of the valid signed aux messages received must be of the form
aux[1](b val) and the estimate is set to b val1 (the value of the coin) on line 15. By line 24 of
Figure 1 this message must contain proofs generated by the is valid predicate supporting binary
value b val1 for round 1. This can only happen on line 03 of Figure 2 by including t+1 messages of
the form aux[0](b val). Notice then, that given the value for the coin for round 1 is b val1, prevr
will be computed as 0 on line 05, and by line 07 these proofs also satisfy the is valid predicate for
round 2. Thus, all non-faulty processes will then sign and broadcast a valid aux message for round
2 and advance to round 3.
Now assume by induction all non-faulty processes have received enough valid messages to satisfy
the is valid predicate for a round r−1. All processes will then sign and broadcast a valid aux message
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on line 11 of Figure 1, participate in computing the coin, and advance to round r. As a result all
non-faulty processes will receive at least n− t valid signed aux messages from round r − 1.
Let the output of the coin for round r be some binary value b valr.
First consider a non-faulty process whose estimate esti in round r was set to the value ¬b valr
in round r − 1. In this case, by line 12 of Figure 1 the process must have received at least one
valid message aux[r−1](b valr) and its proofs proofs. Now given that esti = b valr (i.e. the same
value as the coin), the value prevr computed on line 05 of the is valid predicate is the same when
is valid is called with input round r − 1 or r. Thus calling predicate is valid(r − 1, esti, proofs) is
equivalent to calling is valid(r, esti, proofs), and given that aux values i contains proofs (line 26),
esti will satisfy the is valid predicate for round r.
Now consider a non-faulty process whose estimate esti in round r was set to b valr in round
r − 1. In this case, by line 12 of Figure 1 the process must have received at least n − t valid
aux[r− 1](¬b valr) messages. Then by lines 05 and 07 of Figure 2 these same messages satisfy the
is valid predicate for round r and b valr.
Note that Lemma 3.3 only says that estimates broadcast by non-faulty processes satisfy the
is valid predicate, but does not ensure that these values actually satisfy the validity definitions, the
following lemmas will show this.
Lemma 3. In round r > 0 non-faulty processes will only sign and broadcast aux messages con-
taining binary values proposed by non-faulty processes.
Proof. By Lemma 3.3, a process will only broadcast messages that satisfy the is valid predicate.
By lines 03, 06, 07 of the is valid predicate, in any round r > 0 a binary value will only satisfy the
predicate if the process has received at least t + 1 signed aux messages from different processes.
Given that there are at most t faults and by induction, non-faulty processes will only broadcast
values proposed by non-faulty processes.
The idea of the next lemma is to show that if a binary is never valid in a round r, then it will
never be valid in any round after r.
Lemma 4. If a round rf > 0, a binary value b val, and any set proofs of signed aux messages
never satisfy the is valid predicate, then then predicate will never be satisfied for b val and any round
rn > rf .
Given the construction of the is valid predicate, for rounds following rf the predicate will output
the same result as it would for round rf until one round after the coin flip outputs value ¬b val
(i.e. until the value for prev r is computed as a new value on line 05).
Now let rn be the first round after rf where the value of the coin is b val, (i.e. prev r is
computed to be rn − 1). Given that b val is not valid in rounds rf , . . . , rn − 1, by lines 13-15 no
non-faulty process will set b val as its estimate and will not broadcast an aux message containing
b val in these rounds.
As a result no process will receive more than t signed aux messages containing b val in these
rounds and none of the lines of the is valid predicate will be satisfied as they require at least t+ 1
messages. By induction the same argument holds true for all following rounds.
Proof.
Lemma 5. All non-faulty processes decide the same value.
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Proof. Assume a non-faulty process decides a binary value b val in round rx. By line 11 the process
must have received n− t signed aux[rx](b val) messages from different processes and the output of
the coin for round rx must have been b val. Also by line 11 for this or a different non-faulty process
to decide ¬b val, the process must receive n − t signed aux[ry](¬b val) messages from different
processes in some round ry. Furthermore by lines 21 and the c-global property of the coin we have
ry 6= rx.
First assume ry > rx. By Lemma 1, no process will receive n−t signed aux[rx](¬b val) messages
from different processes and by Lemma and line 10 of Figure 1, a non-faulty process will only sign
and broadcast a value that satisfies the is valid predicate.
Given that there are less than n − t signed aux[rx](¬b val) messages from different processes,
¬b val will never be valid in round rx (lines 05, 08 of the is valid predicate) and by Lemma 4, will
not be valid in any following round. Thus, by line 20 ¬b val will not be decided in any round after
rx (note that the case on line 06 of the is valid does not apply here because the value for prev r
computed for ¬b val will always be at least rx).
Next assume ry < rx. If a process receives n− t signed aux[ry](¬b val) from different processes
and decides ¬b val in round ry then using the same argument as above, no non-faulty process
will receive n− t signed aux[rx](b val) in any following round and will not decide b val. Thus by
contradiction no process will decide ¬b val in a round prior to rx.
Lemma 6. Let rf be the smallest round in which a non-faulty process decides and the value of the
coin in this round be b val. All non-faulty processes will decide in either round rf or the first round
rn > rf where the value the value of the coin in rn is b val.
Proof. Given line 21 of Figure 1, a non-faulty process decides b val in round rf after receiving n− t
signed aux[rf ](b val) from different processes. By Lemma 1 no process will receive n − t signed
aux[r](¬v) messages from different processes, and by lines 05-07 of the is valid predicate, ¬b val
will never be valid in round rf . Furthermore, given Lemma 4, ¬b val will not be valid in round
any round after rf . From this and by Lemma 3.3, in all rounds after rf all non-faulty processes
will broadcast messages containing the binary b val. Thus by line 20 of Figure 1 in the first round
rn after rf where the value of the coin is b val, all non-faulty processes will wait until they receive
n− t signed aux[rn](b val) messages from different processes, and decide on line 12.
Lemma 7. The algorithm terminates in expected O(1) rounds.
Proof. Given the c-threshold property of the coin and that t < n/3, the value of the coin will not
be revealed in a round r > 0 until at least t+1 non-faulty processes have participated in computing
the output of the coin, i.e. t + 1 non-faulty processes have reached line 17 of Figure 1. Consider
the following two possible cases at the point where the t+ 1th non-faulty process reaches this line,
just before the value of the coin for round r is revealed.
• First assume that at least one of the t + 1 non-faulty process has received n − t valid
aux[r](b val) messages for a single binary value b val on line 12 and set its estimate to
b val on line 14. Now given c-random, the output of the coin for round r will be b val with
probability 1/2 and the process will decide if it has not already done so on line 21.
• Otherwise all t+ 1 non-faulty processes that have reached line 17 did not receive n− t valid
aux for a single binary value, and as a result set their estimate to c val on line 15. Let the
result of the coin for round r be some binary value b val. In round r+ 1 these t+ 1 processes
will have b val as their estimate and broadcast the message aux[r+1](b val). Given t < n/3,
any set of n−t valid aux messages from round r+1 will contain at least one aux[r+1](b val)
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message. Now given c-random, the output for the coin in round r+ 1 will be the same binary
value b val with probability 1/2. In this case, all non-faulty processes will set their estimate
to b val in this round given that they received at least one aux[r+ 1](b val) message (line 15
of Figure 1). Now given that any set of n − t valid messages for round r + 1 contains at
least one aux[r + 1](b val) message, ¬b val will never satisfy the is valid predicate for round
r+ 2 (lines 05-07) and given Lemma 4, ¬b val will not be valid in round any following round.
From this and by Lemma 3.3, in all rounds after r+ 1 all non-faulty processes will broadcast
aux messages containing the binary b val. Thus by line 20 of Figure 1 in the first round rn
after r + 1 where the value of the coin is b val, all non-faulty processes will wait until they
receive n− t signed aux[rn](b val) messages from different processes, and decide on line 12 if
not already done.
Thus, in any round a non-faulty process will reach a state where termination is ensured with
probability of at least 1/2. Termination is then ensured with probailibty 1 −∏∞r=1 1/2 = 1. Fur-
thermore, the expected number of rounds to reach a state from which termination is ensured is∑∞
r=1 r
1
2n = 2, and by Lemma 6 all processes will decide by the next round where the coin flip
results in the same value, i.e. another expected 2 rounds.
Theorem 1. The algorithm presented in Figure 1 solves the Binary consensus problem in BAMPn,t[t <
n/3].
Proof. First recall the definition of Binary Byzantine Consensus.
• BBC-Termination. Every non-faulty process eventually decides on a value.
• BBC-Agreement. No two non-faulty processes decide on different values.
• BBC-Validity. If all non-faulty processes propose the same value, no other value can be
decided.
BBC-Termination is ensured by Lemma 7. BBC-Agreement and BBC-Validity are ensured by
Lemmas 5 and 3 respectively.
4 Implementation and experiments.
Stopping and garbage collection. The algorithm shown in Figure 1 continues to execute
rounds forever. To avoid this, if a non-faulty process decides in round r it can simply broadcast a
“proof” of decision, containing the n− t messages that allowed it to decide and stop immediately.
Furthermore, the broadcast of this message may be delayed until the process receives a valid
message from another process from round r + 1, ensuring that if all processes decide in round r
then no extra messages will be sent. Note that in implementation, a process can not be immediately
garbage collected as it needs to ensure that its messages are reliably delivered (reliable channels
are often implemented through the use of re-transmissions when needed). Fortunately, in a system
that is executing multiple consensus instances, garbage collection of earlier instances can be easily
coordinated in later instances (this is not described here as it depends on the requirements of the
specific system).
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Cryptographic signatures and validity proofs. Including proofs of validity with messages is
necessary for the correctness of the algorithm, but is not often needed in the expected case. In fact
in the presence of reliable channels the validity proofs are needed only in the case of faults. Given
this, for efficiency an implementation may choose not to include proofs with messages by default
and instead have processes request proofs from the sender of the message if the recipient cannot
validate the message itself. At worst, this slows down the execution of the algorithm as a non-faulty
process may have to wait to receive proofs from another non-faulty process. Furthermore note that
most proofs are a set of n− t signatures of a single aux message, and given that the algorithm uses
n− t threshold signatures for the coin messages, the same public keys can be used to sign proofs,
reducing the proofs to a single signature in most cases.
Reducing the message steps In each round a non-faulty process broadcasts an aux message,
waits until is receives n − t valid aux messages, then broadcasts a coin message, and waits to
receive n− t valid coin messages before continuing to the next round, meaning each round includes
the latency of at least 2 message propagations.
For round r > 0 this can be reduced to the latency of a single message propagation by combining
the coin message from round r with the aux message of round r+1 and broadcasting them together.
Notice that before the coin is broadcast in round r on line 17, the estimate that will be broadcast
for round r + 1 has already been computed on lines 13-15, and the messages that will be used to
generate its proofs have already been received. At this point only the value of the coin for round r
is unknown, so in the case that esti was set to c val on line 15 of Figure 1 the node will broadcast
an aux message containing c val instead of a binary value. When nodes receive aux message
containing c val they will simply wait until they know the value of the coin for this round, then
use these messages as if they contained the same binary value as the coin. Proofs for both binary
values must be included with the message. Note that given aux messages can now hold 3 different
values, a proof of validity for a round r and binary value b val may contain messages of the form
aux[r](c val) and aux[r](b val) and as a result the proofs may contain n− t signatures instead of
a single threshold signature.
Notice that this modification obviously does not alter either BBC-Agreement or BBC-Validity
as the logic of the algorithm is unchanged. Furthermore BBC-Termination remains valid as there
still are t + 1 non-faulty nodes who have computed their estimate before the value of the coin is
revealed as needed by Lemma 7.
4.1 Experiments
The algorithm has been implemented using the Go [24] programming language. Reliable channels
are implemented through message re-transmission. All messages contain the same predefined unique
32 byte string so that signatures cannot be reused between different experiments. All received
messages are stored to disk in an append only log allowing processes to recover quickly after a
crash failure. Threshold signatures use the implementation of threshold BLS [4] included in the
Kyber library [26].
Experiments were run on Google Could Compute using 10, 20, 40, and 80 n1-standard-1 in-
stances (3.75 GiB of memory, 1 vCPU - a single hardware Hyper-thread, local SSD, 2 Gbps max-
imum egress bandwidth). The instances were spread evenly across ten regions in Asia, Australia,
Europe, North America, and South America.
In each experiment nodes run 5 “warm-up” instances of binary consensus, followed by 50 ad-
ditional binary consensus instances from which the results are calculated, with the graphs showing
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the minimum, maximum and average values. For each binary consensus instance nodes choose a
random binary proposal.
Note that given the large number of random variables in the experiments we expect to see a
large amount of variance in the results. Ideally we would run consensus many more times to get
more stable results, but were unable to due to budget constraints. Instead, in order to reduce
the effect of randomness, the node’s proposals and the outputs of the coin flips are chosen using a
seeded random generator that is reused for each experiment. Note that the coin is still generated
as described using threshold signatures, just the output is not used.
Furthermore given the low CPU power of the nodes and high computation cost of cryptography
we expect to see better performance on more capable machines, though again we were unable to
do this here due to budget constraints.
(a) Latency (b) Bytes sent
(c) Decision round (d) Participation round
Figure 3: Experiment results with 10, 20, 40, and 80 single hardware thread nodes, where messages
contain proofs of validity.
Figure 3 shows the results of the experiment where false CombineMessages are the results of
the standard algorithm and true CombineMessages are the results with the optimization described
previously combining the coin message with the aux message of the following round. Figure 3(a)
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shows the average latency of executing a single consensus instance, Figure 3(b) shows the average
number of bytes sent for a single consensus instance for all nodes, Figure 3(c) shows the average,
minimum, and maximum decision round of the consensus instances, Figure 3(d) shows the average,
minimum, and maximum participation (i.e. termination) round the consensus instances.
For false CombineMessages and 10 nodes we see average latencies around 500 milliseconds and
true CombineMessages being approximately 75 milliseconds lower (Figure 3(a)). As the number
of nodes increases, the latency increases to over 2 seconds, with true CombineMessages being
slower than false CombineMessages. This increase is largely created by the increase in computation
needed to validate signatures. To demonstrate this Figure 4 shows the latency results of the same
experiment, except where signature validations are replaced with sleeps of the estimated time to
validate a signature, where up to 4 sleeps can be run concurrently (i.e. simulating a machine
with 4 processing cores). Of course this is not completely realisitic as it does not simulate other
operations that could slow down the execution such as cache invlidations and garbage collection
and is just for demonstration. In this case the latency of true CombineMessages remains lower
than false CombineMessages by between 75 to 100 milliseconds and all averages stay below 600
milliseconds.
Figure 4: Experiment results for 80 single hardware thread nodes, where up to 4 concurrent sleeps
are performed instead signature validation to simulate a 4 core machine.
Concerning the number of rounds needed to decide, in all cases the average is approximately 3
rounds (Figure 3(c)) with 2 being the minimum. The maximum is 11 rounds. With false CombineMessages,
nodes terminate in the same round as they decide, while in the case of true CombineMessages nodes
always participate in 1 round following the round in which they decide (Figure 3(d)). This is simply
because the coin message that results in the decision includes the message from the following round.
This in addition to the fact that the proofs of validity may be able to use threshold signatures as
described previously explains the increase in the number of bytes sent by true CombineMessages
(Figure 3(b)),
Figure 5 shows the results of the same experiment as Figure 3, except here messages do not
contain proofs of validity. As mentioned previously, the proofs are only needed in the case of faults
and can be sent on request when needed by the receiver node. Overall the results are fairly similar,
with the main difference being that the number of bytes sent is greatly reduced. This is no surprise
given that the consensus is over a binary value and the main payload of the messages are the
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(a) Latency (b) Bytes sent
(c) Decision round (d) Participation round
Figure 5: Experiment results with 10, 20, 40, and 80 single hardware thread nodes, where messages
do not contain proofs of validity.
signatures.
Finally Figure 6 shows the results of an experiment with 10 nodes each with 4 hardware threads,
running 1000 consensus instances and without including proofs of validity. Furthermore, the actual
values from the coin flips are used. The idea here is to perhaps have a more realistic experiment as
more powerful nodes are used and consensus is run many more times (only 10 nodes are used due to
budget constraints). Here we see similar results as the previous experiments, except with somewhat
higher average latencies and higher maximum and average termination rounds, which should be
expected given the randomness of the experiments and the increased number of executions.
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(a) Latency (b) Bytes sent
(c) Decision round (d) Participation round
Figure 6: Experiment results for 1000 consensus instances with 10 nodes each with 4 hardware
threads.
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